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Compensation payments to farmers for the provision of agri-environmental services are awell-established policy
scheme under the EU Common Agricultural Policy. However, in spite of the success in most EU countries in the
uptake of the programme by farmers, the impact of the scheme on the long term commitment of farmers to
change their practices remains poorly documented. To explore this issue, this paper presents the results of struc-
tured ﬁeld interviews and a quantitative survey in theWalloon Region of Belgium. Themain ﬁnding of this study
is that farmerswho have periodic contactswith network bridging organisations that foster cooperation and social
learning in the agri-environmental landscapes show a higher commitment to change. This effect is observed both
for farmers with high and low concern for biodiversity depletion. Support for network bridging organisations is
foreseenunder the EU Leader programmeand the EU regulation 1306/2013,which could open-up interesting op-
portunities for enhancing the effectiveness of the current payment scheme for agri-environmental services.
© 2015 Published by Elsevier B.V.
1. Introduction
Research over the last two decades has shown that human inﬂu-
ences on global life-support systems have reached amagnitude unprec-
edented in human history (Jerneck et al., 2010). On the one hand, pro-
growth economic policies have encouraged technological innovations
and rapid accumulation of consumption goods (Komiyama and
Takeuchi, 2006; Orecchini et al., 2012). This resulted in increased
human prosperity inmany parts of theworld, although in a globally dis-
proportionate manner. On the other hand, by depleting the world's
stock of natural wealth on a global scale – often irreversibly – the pre-
vailing, and predominant, economic and development models have in-
creasingly detrimental impacts on thewellbeing of present generations,
in particular leading to a broadening ecological crisis and ever-widening
social disparities. Concomitantly, these models present tremendous
risks and challenges for future generations.
In response to these rapid changes, policy makers, in conjunction
with researchers and civil society organisations, have organised over
the last three decades vast scientiﬁc assessment efforts (Haas, 2004),
developed a growing body of environmental law-making and have
set up environmental bureaucracies to implement new regulatory
regimes. However, in spite of important progress in many areas, the
situation of rapidly degrading ecosystem services has not been
reversed. The situation is worrisome, in particular because most of
the driving forces of environmental change, such as economic growth,
resource use and energy consumption, continue to increase (Jaeger,
2011).
Twomajor reasons for the lack of signiﬁcant progress highlighted by
sustainability scholars are, ﬁrst, the poor integration of environmental
policies with other policy ﬁelds and, second, the failure of conventional
expert-led and state-centred governance regimes to deal with highly
uncertain and complex transition processes. First, the lack of integration
of environmental policieswith other ﬁelds leads to lock-in in unsustain-
able socio-ecological states, as progress in environmental sustainability
can be hampered by the interdependence between natural resource
regimes, technological infrastructure and socio-economic patterns
of consumption and production (Arthur, 1994; Smith et al., 2005;
Geels and Schot, 2007). What is needed to overcome such lock-in are
governance regimes which are not only functionally stable in each of
their sub-systems, but which generate a societal transition in a conver-
gent and mutually supporting way between the various sub-systems
(Pahl-Wostl, 2007a,b). Second, many of the sustainability problems
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are characterised by scientiﬁc uncertainty and complexity. In particular,
knowledge about the dynamics of socio-ecological systems is dispersed
amongst local, regional and national agencies and groups. For such
problems, state-centred and expert-led approaches to transition alone
– in spite of their important role in building convergent and evidence-
based knowledge (Haas, 2004) – have been shown to be insufﬁcient
to generate the necessary societal change (Berkes, 2009). In response
to these challenges, both social actors and policy makers have called
for increasing cooperation and social learning amongst state and non-
state collective actors.
This paper aims to contribute to the growing literature on the role of
collaborative networks of state and non-state collective actors in policy
integration and social learning for policy integration in the ﬁeld of sus-
tainability transitions. Such collaborative networks have emerged in
the 1990s as an important complement to the conventional market-
based or regulatory forms of governance. These collaborative networks
might include collaborative forms of governance amongst and within
state organisations, environmental and socio-cultural associations, re-
search institutions,worker unions, employers' federations and social co-
operatives amongst others (Kanie and Haas, 2004; Delmas and Young,
2009). As shown in the literature, the combination of markets, govern-
mental hierarchies and networks is especially important to improve the
effectiveness of environmental policies (Dedeurwaerdere, 2005a,
2005b).
The study focuses in particular on one prominent case of the integra-
tion of environmental policies with other policy ﬁelds through such
collaborative networks, namely, agri-environmental measures in the
context of the EU Common Agricultural Policy. Environmental policy
integration is part of the constitutional requirements of the EU
(as speciﬁed in the Treaty on the functioning of the EU) and has to be
applied in particular to the Common Agricultural Policy (Mestre et al.,
2011). In practice, agri-environmental policy contributes to policy inte-
gration through a policy of payments to farmers for voluntary measures
to implement environmental farming practices. As argued in the litera-
ture on payments for environmental services, such voluntary payment
schemes are expected to contribute to environmental goals at low
costs and without introducing additional direct regulations, to enlist
state, market, non-proﬁt organisations and civic actors in the design
and delivery of public policy, and to support economic growth, while
still achieving regulatory and conservation goals (Paavola and
Hubacek, 2013).
In spite of this well-established scheme within the Common
Agricultural Policy, the implementation of agri-environmental mea-
sures in general mainly proceeds according to a traditional state-led
and expert-led mode of governance and fails to achieve the stated
goals of integration. Indeed, implementation is often managed by a
centralised follow-up committee appointed in each member state (or
the regional authority in the member state), which is characterised by
a top-down approach of design and monitoring of the scheme
(Morris, 2006). However, the top-down approach does not address
the social learning needs amongst the multiple stakeholders operating
in the agri-environmental landscapes. As a result, in spite of the relative
success in the uptake of this scheme throughout Europe, farmers who
adopt agri-environmental measures tend to conform to the require-
ments of the scheme only formally, but do not necessarily embark
upon a social learning process that contributes to an integration of
the environmental practices with other practices in the agro-
environmental landscape and to a long-term change in agricultural
practices.
Based on this literature, the hypothesis of the paper is that a policy of
economic compensation payments alone for the provision of environ-
mental services will not be enough to overcome the insufﬁciencies of
the direct regulation approach to environmental public goods provision.
To reach the goals of more sustainable agri-environmental manage-
ment, the important issues of multi-stakeholder cooperation and social
learning in collaborative networks of state and non-state collective
actors (hereunder designated by “collaborative networks”) also need
to be addressed. To test this hypothesis and to evaluate the possible
role of these collaborative networks in addressing the challenges of
agri-environmental service provision, this paper analyses a series of
in-depth ﬁeld interviews and a quantitative survey with farmers in
the Walloon Region of Belgium who participate in the agri-
environmental payment scheme. The paper is organised as follows:
The second section discusses the possible contribution of the collabora-
tive networks in improving the environmental effectiveness of the agri-
environmental payment scheme. The third section presents a speciﬁc
set of collaborative network organisations, which are the network
bridging organisations, and explains how such bridging organisations
can help to address the important challenge of knowledge co-
production and exchange in these collaborative networks, both
in an economically efﬁcient and socially legitimate way. The fourth
section presents the materials and methods of the empirical ﬁeld-
work and the survey. Section ﬁve presents and discusses themain re-
sults. The policy recommendations that result from the analysis are
discussed in the electronic supplementary material provided with
the article.
2. The Role of Collaborative Networks in Building Partnerships for
Environmental Public Goods Provision in Agriculture
In the countries of Western Europe, mechanisation of agriculture
and the massive use of chemical inputs have led, at least since
the SecondWorld War, to the intensiﬁcation of agricultural production
systems, higher levels of specialization and an increase in size of farms
and farm plots. This in turn has led both to a dramatic increase in agri-
cultural output and to serious negative consequences for the environ-
ment. The Common Agricultural Policy, put into place at the beginning
of the 1960s, is a major driver of this process (Posthumus and Morris,
2010). One prominent and well-documented illustration is the detri-
mental impact on farmland bird populations (Butler et al., 2010).
Between 1980 and 2009, the farmland bird population has decreased
in Europe from 600 million to 300 million, implying a loss of 50%.
The removal of hedgerows and the ploughing over of meadows are
two signiﬁcant factors that have contributed to more efﬁcient farming,
but they have also contributed to the decrease in farmland birds'
habitats.
To take into account this and other detrimental environmental
impacts of agriculture policies, environmental organisations and
policy makers have advocated a series of reforms of the EU Common
Agricultural Policy. In particular, the 1992MacSharry reforms, which in-
troduced agri-environmental schemes (AES), played a major role in the
efforts to alleviate these detrimental impacts. However, as has also been
discussed elsewhere, other factors also played a role in the adoption of
these reforms (Burton and Schwarz, 2013). In particular, both the
decision to have recourse to compensation payments as the main tool
for the EU agri-environmental policy and the design of these payment
schemes were inﬂuenced by the negotiations of the Uruguay
round and the subsequent rules adopted under the WTO agreement.
In particular, WTO requirements lead to use action-oriented payments,
based on compensation payments for the delivery of speciﬁc land man-
agement practices, instead of outcome-based measures focused on the
provision of environmental outcomes. In addition, under the WTO
rules, any compensation for the services delivered should remain
limited to the additional cost of compliance incurred. In spite of some
obvious limits of the scheme (Berendse et al., 2004; Goetz and
Brouwer, 2010), such as its limited action on the realisation of long-
term attitudinal changes of farmers, the action-based approaches have
become the dominant means of securing environmental public goods
in Europe.
With no major alterations to the WTO agreement, this approach is
likely to remain a key policy environmental tool and there is a well-
recognised need for further improvements of the design, targeting and
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implementation of the agri-environmental measures (Zabel and Roe,
2009; Herzon and Mikk, 2007). Two important implementation
challenges, which hamper the further improvement in the effective re-
alisation of the stated environmental objectives, are the focus of this
paper and will be analysed in relation to the agri-environmental mea-
sures which have been proposed in the Walloon Region of Belgium
in the 5-year period with the farmers running from 2007 to 2013
(cf. Table 1).
The ﬁrst challenge is related to the nature of the environmental
requirements of the measures (deﬁned as the gap between the speciﬁ-
cations of the measures and the general legal compulsory baseline
related to good agri-environmental practices). Some measures under
the scheme impose a higher level of environmental requirements to
the farmers (which we will call hereunder “medium” or “deep green”
agri-environmental measures), while others impose a lower level
of environmental requirements (which we will call “light green”
agri-environmental measures), as illustrated in Table 1. Even if a
higher environmental outcome will already be reached when more
farmers adopt more measures, a better result will be obtained if the
proportion of medium/deep measures can be increased as the latter
lead to higher environmental outcomes. However, in practice, a lot
of farmers tend to adhere only to the light green measures and
fewer farmers adhere in addition to the medium or deep green
(Defrancesco et al., 2008). This might be related to the difﬁculty to
apply the medium/deep measures on certain farms (as some of
these measures require a pre-existing ecological potential) or to
thewillingness of the farmer to accept the environmental service provi-
sion contract in spite of a given compensation payment (which is ad-
justed, as best as possible, to the average economic opportunity costs
for the farmer).
The second challenge is related to the long-term change in agricul-
tural practices. A substantial change in practices by the farmers is one
of the important means envisioned in the scheme for better reaching
the environmental objectives (Zabel and Roe, 2009). Indeed somemea-
sures can be implemented through simply maintaining the existing
practices on the farm (for instance, continuing to maintain existing
hedgerows). This might already be considered as a positive result of
the payment scheme. But in many situations a change towards more
environmental practices is required to effectively implement ameasure
or to improve the environmental outcomes in the agri-environmental
landscape. For instance, for some measures, the environmental impact
may depend on the action on several farms and not just one. In other
cases, the farmer might chose only to keep existing hedgerows when
applying to the scheme or to plant new hedgerows on his farm, when
this allows to better connect parcels of ecological interest in the land-
scape. However, adhesion to the scheme is not always linked with
such a change in environmental practices by farmers, even for those
farmers who adhere to the deep or medium measures, where such
change is feasible on the farm or in caseswhere it is an essential compo-
nent of effective implementation (Burton et al., 2008; Poláková et al.,
2011).
To overcome these shortcomings, scholars have highlighted the
need to look beyond the formal aspects of the governmental payment
scheme. Indeed, actors that participate in payment schemes for envi-
ronmental services are in part motivated by the monetary compensa-
tion, but may also be motivated by the satisfaction of social norms and
personal values (Morris and Potter, 1995; Defrancesco et al., 2008;
Burton and Paragahawewa, 2011; Rico García-Amado et al., 2013;
Mills et al., 2013; Primmer et al., 2014). This is in particular true in the
case of agri-environmental public goods, where social–cultural and
ecological value dimensions play an important role, in addition to the
economic value dimensions (cf. De Groot and Rudolf, 2002, 2006).
When social norms and personal values play an important role in the
decision-making over alternatives (under similar economic outcomes,
and similar level of information), collaborative networks that build
trust amongst the actors and foster learning of the new social norms
(Muradian and Rival, 2012) have been shown to be more likely to
lead to change in actors' behaviour (Dedeurwaerdere, 2005a, 2005b;
Rydin, 2006; Dedeurwaerdere, 2007; Innes and Booher, 2010; Bodin
and Prell, 2011).
Table 1
AEM scheme in theWalloon Region of Belgium (with the exception of AEM11, speciﬁcally related to organic farming). Participation rate amongst a total number of 15,274 farmers, for year
2010 (table based on data fromGIREA, 2011). The categorisation in light/medium/deep is not based on the difﬁculty of implementing themeasure on a given farm, but on an assessment of
the gap between the technical requirements of the measures and the general legal compulsory baseline (independently of the effort that a given farmer needs to make to implement the
measures, which will be assessed in Section 5.2 below):
Light/medium/deep measures: measures to implement a set of environmental farming practices (satisfying a set of environmental objectives) that go a little/moderately/far beyond the
existing general legal compulsory requirements that specify the minimum level of good agri-environmental practices.
Spatial targeting of themeasures for speciﬁc ecological areas: an increase in payment is foreseen for application in ecologically valuable areas (1a, 1b, 1c, 2, 3a, 3b), speciﬁc ecological areas
are required (3b) or approval of an environmental advisor is required (8, 9, 10).
Main environmental objective Compensation payment Spatial
targeting
Participation
rate
Light AEM AEM1a Hedges Strengthening the ecological network 50€/200 m + 33%
AEM3a⁎ Grass strips along crops Strengthening the ecological network 900€/ha + 13%
AEM4 Winter catch crops Water ecosystem protection 100€/ha + 22%
AEM1b Isolated trees Strengthening the ecological network 25€/10 el. + 15%
Medium AEM AEM1c Ponds Strengthening the ecological network 50€/el. + 10%
AEM2 Natural grasslands Strengthening the ecological network 200€/ha + 13%
AEM3b Strip of extensive grassland Strengthening the ecological network/water
ecosystem protection
900€/ha ++ 7%
AEM5 Extensive cereals Water ecosystem protection 100€/ha no 4%
AEM6 Endangered breeds Agricultural biodiversity 120€/cattle, 30€/sheep,
2000€/equine
/ b4%
Deep AEM AEM7 Low cattle density Low input/low environmental impact
production system
100€/ha / 4%
AEM8 Grasslands of high biological value Natura 2000 habitats and other high nature
value grassland
450€/ha ++ 5%
AEM9 Speciﬁc buffer strips Strengthening the ecological network, water and
soil protection, targeted species
1250€/ha ++ 7%
AEM10 AE action plan Multi-environmental objectives 1000–3000€/farm +++ b4%
⁎ This measure has “medium” level technical speciﬁcations but was included in the light measures in this study, because for some of the farms in the research sample that received this
payment not all the technical speciﬁcations were implemented in practice.
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In the ﬁeld of study of environmental governance, collaborative
networks can be deﬁned through three distinguishing features (Pahl-
Wostl, 2009):
1) a high level of social regulation through informal institutions, which
depend on social norms for rule enforcement, in addition to formal
institutions, which are controlled and monitored by the legal
apparatus of the state;
2) a high degree of participation of a broad set of stakeholders in the
governance process and
3) the recourse to interactive problem solving amongst a decentralised
network of collective actors.
Empirical evidence supports the contribution of these features to
improving environmental outcomes. First, governance networks
have proven to be essential in situations of heterogeneity amongst
the concerned actors (Nooteboom, 2006; Olsson et al., 2006). In
particular, they may be very ﬂexible in terms of enrolment of new
participants, and in terms of the role and type of actors and connec-
tions. Moreover, because of the absence of formal control, they may
be much more open-ended, in particular by supporting multiple
ways of envisioning and operationalising various transition path-
ways. Second, broad participation in the environmental policy
schemes can reduce the likelihood of unexpected resistance in the
implementation (Berkes et al., 2003). As has been shown in the
vast literature on community produced public goods, participation
can lead to increased compliance and effectiveness with the com-
mon rules for sustainable use of common pool resources (Ostrom,
1990). Third, including a broader set of stakeholders gives access to
different kinds of knowledge which may be vital for ﬁnding innova-
tive solutions (Berkes and Folke, 2002). Finally, modular system
structures and decentralised control can lead to higher degree of
adaptiveness and robustness of a system (Pahl-Wostl, 2009; Miller
and Page, 2007). However, governance networks based on these fea-
tures can also fail, suffer from problems of legitimacy or from high
implementation costs. The key message from the literature is there-
fore that a more diversiﬁed governance system, which has recourse
to government, market and collaborative networks, will lead to a
higher adaptive capacity for tackling complex socio-ecological
problems.
In order to explore the impact of the participation of farmers in such
collaborative networks on their adhesion to the agri-environmental
scheme and their environmental efforts, a better understanding of
the roles of these networks is needed. In particular, as highlighted
above, collaborative networks are needed that address the social
learning needs amongst the various actors in the agri-environmental
landscapes and a more effective cooperation amongst conventional
expert-led knowledge production on the one hand and the practi-
tioners' knowledge on the other. This paper will therefore focus on
one particular type of collaborative network organisation, which is the
network bridging organisation (also called boundary organisation).
The speciﬁc role of this type of organisation is to facilitate the co-
production and exchange of knowledge amongst actors within the
network with different cognitive background frames. The next
section addresses the role of these network bridging organisations
from a theoretical perspective, with the view to understanding their
contribution to knowledge co-production and exchange on environ-
mental public goods both from the point of view of the efﬁciency
(theory of public good economics) and social legitimacy (theory of
social learning).
3. The Contribution of Network Bridging Organisations to
Environmental Public Goods Provision
The provision of environmental public goods through private actors,
such as the environmental services in the agricultural landscapes, in-
volves complex forms of collaborative governance with individual
providers, users, stakeholders and government. In this context, many
studies have focused on one particular form of collaborative gover-
nance, which has proven particularly effective. This is formal co-
management with a high level of ofﬁcially agreed power-sharing
amongst the government and the user/stakeholder groups (Berkes,
2009; Dedeurwaerdere, 2009). However, formal co-management re-
gimes between the state and user/stakeholder groups are not well de-
veloped within the context of the implementation of the Common
Agricultural Policy.
The networks of state and non-state collective actors that
emerged in response to the participatory governance challenges of
the agri-environmental scheme are situated somewhere in between
the formal co-management and a purely advisory model of co-
governance. An example of an advisory model of co-governance is
the environmental forum in Germany, which has been put in place
in the context of the agri-environmental policy (Prager and Nagel,
2008). In such an advisory model, the non-state actors are consulted
by a regulatory/centralised state, but have no decision-making
power or direct impact on the implementation decisions beyond
the consultative mechanism. In contrast, the collaborative networks
establish a horizontal form of cooperation amongst a diversity
of actors and the state, which directly inﬂuences the implementa-
tion of the policies for the provision of environmental public
goods. The respective roles of these different forms of co-
governance in agri-environmental public goods provision are illus-
trated in Table 2.
However, collaborative networks on their own are unlikely
to overcome the challenges raised by environmental public goods
provision. Indeed, as highlighted for instance in the review paper
by Berkes (2009), managing the provision of environmental public
goods through collaborative governance is an information-
intensive endeavour. In many contexts, the different actors need to
work and think together based on knowledge from different sources
(from scientists, practitioners and governmental expertise), deliber-
ate to generate new knowledge and engage in social learning over
new normative orientations and common understandings. This com-
plex process of knowledge provision in situations of collaborative
governance therefore often relies on so-called bridging organisa-
tions, which organise knowledge co-production and social learning
amongst the various actors and types of knowledge. Fig. 1 illustrates
the role of such bridging organisations for the speciﬁc case of agri-
environmental public goods provided by farmers. As can be seen
from this ﬁgure, the possible types of knowledge co-produced
by such bridging organisations can be very broad and no single orga-
nisation is likely to supply all of these functions. Therefore, in prac-
tice, a number of organisations, which might also pursue other
objectives in the same time, can fulﬁl the various roles of a bridging
organisation.
The role of bridging organisations has been extensively studied in
the literature in environmental governance in the speciﬁc context of
formal co-management arrangements between the state and local
communities or user groups (cf. Berkes, 2009; Dedeurwaerdere,
2009). Less attention has been given to the possible role of bridging
organisations in the case of collaborative actor networks. Two of
the merits of bridging organisations amongst participants of collabo-
rative networks (which we designate by the term network bridging
organisations) seem especially relevant for improving the effective
implementation of agri-environmental policies andwill be discussed
in the remainder of this section. The ﬁrst is the improvement in the
level of environmental public goods provision by exploiting the com-
plementarities in the available expertise between governmental
agencies and various non-state actors that contribute to the public
good provision. The second is the potential for facilitating the process
of social learning and co-production of knowledge amongst the stake-
holders, private sector actors and local/regional or national governmen-
tal organisations.
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3.1. Exploiting Knowledge Complementarities in the CollaborativeNetworks
Scholars in public good economics have elaborated a set of basic
models to explain the existence and the efﬁciency beneﬁts of coopera-
tion in collaborative actor networks (Weisbrod, 1988). The basic eco-
nomic approach to the complementary between the various state and
non-state actors contributing to the provision of public goods is based
on the concept of demand heterogeneity for public goods. Demand het-
erogeneity is deﬁned by the fact that different population groups (such
as pro-environmental groups versus rural development organisations)
have divergent demands for public goods in both quantity and quality.
They can for instance agree upon a basic level of pollution mitigation,
but might disagree on the priority of other aspects such as animal wel-
fare, improvement in the quality of agricultural products or preserva-
tion of cultural heritage. Under the hypothesis where the government
ﬁrst attempts to satisfy the demands of the statistically average person,
this can lead to a set of unmet demands of these social groups. These
unmet demandsmight be satisﬁed by highlymotivated individuals, vol-
untary initiatives of ﬁrms or by non-proﬁt organisations, which are
established and ﬁnanced by the voluntary contributions (in terms of
money or participation to activities) of citizens and stakeholders who
want to increase the output or the quality of the public good (Anheier,
2005).
Based on these premises of public good economics, one would
expect national/regional governments to focus their implementation
efforts of agri-environmental measures on a set of measures that
reach the largest number of farmers, which requires measures that
do not go too far above the existing baseline of the general compul-
sory legal baseline of good environmental practices. As highlighted
above, the national/regional governments' implementation of the
EU agri-environmental payment scheme has indeed led to a higher
investment in the light measures, in spite of the obligation under
Table 2
Forms of co-governance between state and non-state collective actors for agri-environmental public good provision.
Core features Illustrative examples Strengths/weaknesses
Co-management between state and
community/user groups (citations in
Berkes, 2009; Dedeurwaerdere, 2009)
Formalised arrangement for power
sharing between the state and non-state
collective actors, through devolution of
power to communities (or user groups).
Indigenous communities' formal
management of forests; joint forest
management organisations
(+) Possibility to more fully exploit local
expertise and knowledge, clear formal
decision-making arrangements
(−) Need for lengthy negotiations to set up
these arrangements
Collaborative networks between state
and non-state collective actors
(cf. references and discussion in
Section 2 above)
Formal and informal arrangements for
horizontal cooperation in the provision
of environmental public goods
Multi-stakeholder management of river
basins; Agenda 21 initiatives in the context
of the implementation of the Convention
on Biological Diversity; Local Action Groups
in the EU LEADER programme
(+) Flexible and adaptive, capacity to create high
involvement informal/horizontal cooperation
(−) Requires some negotiation to set up these
arrangements, in particular to build trust with the
centralised state
Advisory bodies to the
regulatory/centralised state
(Prager and Nagel, 2008)
Consultation by a regulatory/centralised
state of non-state collective actors
Environmental forum in Germany (cf. text
above); EU consultative processes in the
context of the Common Agricultural Policy
(+) Easy to set up, improves the
decision-making quality of the central state
(−) Consultative: full decision-making power
remains with the state
Fig. 1. The role of bridging organisations in social learning and knowledge co-production on agri-environmental public goods (PG).
Adapted from Berkes (2009, p. 1696).
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EU rules to address at least some of the deep and medium measures
as well.
However, in parallel to this ﬁrst trend, the unmet social demands
of a more full-ﬂedged implementation of agri-environmental policy,
advocated by highly environmentally motivated citizens and
social actors, have led to the emergence of a thriving non-proﬁt
sector that provides technical services, knowledge sharing and ad-
vice for improving the provision of the various agri-environmental
public goods. The existence of these non-proﬁt service-providing
organisations in turn opens up interesting possibilities for cooper-
ation between governmental organisations, non-proﬁt organisa-
tions and research institutions (Salamon, 2002; Anheier, 2005,
ch. 13).
On the one hand, the non-proﬁt organisations and research insti-
tutions at universities have developed a set of capacities that can
provide resources to the government for improving its efﬁciency in
implementing its own public good policies. Well documented exam-
ples are the capacity of these organisations to cooperate with various
actors in the agri-environmental landscape level and their in-depth
knowledge of the local contexts in which the farmers operate (Prager
and Nagel, 2008). In addition, the non-proﬁt organisations and autono-
mous research entities are in a better position to inspire trust and to
play a facilitating role in social learning with the farmers, compared to
private sector operators that would be paid by the state to provide an
equivalent level of knowledge and technical services to the farmers
(Anheier, 2005, ch. 13). On the other hand, however, non-proﬁt organi-
sations and research entities might be subject to a set of governance
failures, such as lack of broader social accountability or lack of ﬁnancial
sustainability. The latter failures might be alleviated in the partnership
with the state organisations (Ibid.).
The mobilisation of non-proﬁt organisations is not without risk,
however. By involving non-proﬁt organisations in knowledge co-
production and exchange, governmental actors might fear losing
some public control over the process and face increased monitoring
costs (Kramer, 1987). Moreover, non-proﬁt organisations “may be
forced to conform to standards imposed by contracting policy at the
expense of their own notions of what constitutes efﬁcient delivery”
(Anheier, 2005, p. 289). In other words, if the funding of the non-
proﬁt organisation becomes entirely dependent on the state, there
is a risk that the non-proﬁt organisation strays from its intended
mission. Therefore, an appropriate balance will need to be maintained
in the non-proﬁt organisation between the three main funding
streams of membership contributions (in fees and time), donations/
market services (in money and in kind) and governmental subsidies/
support.
The economic model of the complementarity amongst the
various types of actors operating in the collaborative networks
therefore provides a ﬁrst set of arguments that allow an understand-
ing of the possible role of network bridging organisations: they can
contribute to more systematically exploiting the knowledge comple-
mentarities between the state, non-proﬁt actors and research insti-
tutions, and play the role of a trusted intermediary which provides
for the necessary guarantees for preserving the autonomy of these
actors.
3.2. The Role of Network Bridging Organisations in Social Learning
The public economic perspective, albeit useful to explain the
possible role of the network bridging organisations in more efﬁcient
knowledge co-production and exchange, falls short of addressing the
deeper problem of scientiﬁc uncertainty and social controversy over
the best available socio-ecological transition pathways. In particular,
the economic efﬁciency perspective presupposes that the meaning,
the normative goals and the level of the public good provision are
well known and well deﬁned, as in the expert-led and top-down ap-
proaches to agri-environmental policy. Nevertheless, policymakers,
researchers, farmers, private sector organisations and stakeholders are
all confronted with persistent uncertainties and social controversies
pertaining to agri-environmental public goods, whose effects are often
of a complex multi-scale and multi-faceted (social, environmental, eco-
nomic) nature. Therefore, the increase in efﬁciency through collabora-
tive networking is likely to succeed only if appropriate social learning
processes are put in place that lead to convergent cognitive background
understandings (both factual and normative) across the various actors
and scales.
The social learning challenge seems especially hard to tackle in the
case of agri-environmental measures under the Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP). Indeed, as seen above, many payment schemes only
require farmers to formally implement the required measures, but do
not address more in depth transformation of the agricultural practices
on a landscape scale or do not support collaborative learning on
the relevant agri-environmental issues in a given landscape. In contrast,
the experiments with landscape-level implementation of agri-
environmental measures highlighted above, which are based on
multi-stakeholder collaboration mechanisms and social learning, have
shown a higher involvement by the participating farmers in supporting
long term change.
For instance, in Ontario, Canada, a system of payment for environ-
mental services was jointly administered by the government, a
coalition of 30 farm organisations throughout Ontario and an associ-
ation for soil and crop improvement with farmer experts (Grudens-
Schuck, 2000). In particular the local branches of the Soil and Crop
Improvement Association provided for social learning through
supporting the farmers with the writing of environmental action
plans, providing advice through workshops and follow-up of the
implementation. In this successful scheme, which at present reaches
over 20,000 farms, the government plays a role which is purposefully
not in a pronounced controlling function, but limited to an advisory
and funding role. Other cases documented in the literature are
the role of the sheep owner and cultural association in the Altmühltal
in Southern Germany (OECD, 2013, p. 198) — which coordinated
the application for agri-environmental payments on a regional
scale, the collective approach to the implementation of agri-
environmental measures in the Netherlands through regional groups
and cooperatives (OECD, 2013), and the successful collaboration be-
tween reindeer herders and the authorities in Finland to restore
nesting of the golden eagle through a participatory scheme, after
years of conﬂict-ridden implementation of the compensation payment
policy (Suvantola, 2013).
Social learning in collaborative networks is however not an auto-
matic result of the existence of these networks, nor is it necessarily
part of the mission of the various actors that compose the network.
The literature on social learning in the management of natural re-
sources has highlighted a set of conditions for social learning pro-
cesses to occur. In particular, in their review of over two decades of
empirical research with collaborative processes, Innes and Booher
(2010) highlight three key conditions for successful social learning
processes. These conditions are: inclusiveness, interdependence
and authentic dialogue. First, to lead to effective social learning on
the landscape level, a collaborative rational process has to engage
all those who have pertinent knowledge and a stake in the issue at
hand. Indeed, the long-term adaptive capacity of complex socio-
ecological systems is fostered by a dialogue amongst a broad diversi-
ty of values, interests, perspectives, skills as well as sources of knowl-
edge. As also highlighted by other scholars of social learning,
diversity allows to uncover contradictions and differences, which
in turn foster joint learning processes that take into account such
social divergences. Second, to maintain the interest and energy to
engage in the process, in spite of the evident costs, the participating
actors need to expect higher outcomes from interdependent action
within the collaborative process than from staying outside or relying
on conventional direct governmental regulation or interest-based
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Table 3
Overview of themain categories of organisations that provide knowledge and information to farmers, which were used in the questions on membership/participation by farmers in such
organisations. Numbers are based on the quantitative survey (on a total of 152). One farmer can be amember ofmore than one organisation. Organisationswith an explicit environmental
focus are represented in grey.
Forms of cooperation on knowledge provision in collaborative networks 
of non-state and state collective actors(n of valid observations: 152)
# farmers in 
the sample 
with 
membership 
(multiple 
membership 
possible)
Envi
ron
men
tal 
(yes
/no)
Main role
1. Network bridging organisations in agri-environmental landscapes (providing mechanisms for knowledge co-production and/or  
social learning on agri-environmental public goods in multi-stakeholder networks) 
1.1. Environmental management organisations (regional nature parks, river 
basin contracts, Natagora nature reserve management, Life project 
stakeholder committees, …) 
68 Yes Cooperation in the 
implementation of agri- 
environmental policy 
/facilitator of social 
learning process
1.2. Local action groups under the Common Agricultural Policy (LAG) 21 No Facilitator of social Learning 
process
1.3. Research collaborations with environmental focus 40 Yes Cooperation in knowledge 
co-production/facilitator of 
social learning process
1.4. Research collaborations on agricultural issues without environmental 
focus
35 No Cooperation in knowledge 
co-production/facilitator of 
social learning process
1.5. Peer to peer farmer groups (CETA's, Comices agricoles) 64 Mix
ed
Cooperation in knowledge 
co-production/facilitator of 
social learning process
2. Market cooperation
2.1. Producer-consumer networks with environmental focus (COPROSAIN, 
GAC, AMAP, etc.)
43 Yes Market cooperation
2.2. Producer-consumer networks without environmental focus (regional 
labels, market cooperatives, etc.)
29 No Market cooperation
2.3. Groups for joint acquisition of machines (CUMA's) 22 No Market Cooperation 
3. Advocacy network organisations in agri-environmental landscapes 
3.1. Farmer unions with an environmental profile (FUGEA, MAP, etc.) 24 Yes Advocacy
3.2. Farmer unions without an environmental profile (FWA, AWE, MIG, etc.) 92 No Advocacy
Acronyms of organisations used in the table
• GAC: Groupe d'achat collectif (collective acquisition of farm food baskets in direct producer consumer relationship)
• AMAP: Association pour l'agriculture paysanne (same as GAC, but with a longer term contract with the farmers)
• COPROSAIN: Coopérative de produits sains (a cooperative of sustainable farm products)
• FUGEA: Fédération Unie de Groupements d'Eleveurs et d'Agriculteurs (Union of Farmers and Cattle Breeders)
• MAP Mouvement d'action paysanne (Movement for peasant action)
• FWA: Fédération wallonne de l'agriculture (Walloon Farmers' Union)
• AWE: Association Wallonne de l'élevage (Walloon Association of Cattle Breeders)
• MIG: Milcherzeuger Interessengemeinschaft (Union of Milk Producers)
• CUMA: Coopérative d'utilisation de matériel agricole (Cooperative for the use of Agricultural Machinerie)
• CETA: Centre d'études techniques agricoles (Centres for technical agricultural studies)
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lobbying. Third, the social learning process needs to be considered
legitimate by all the participating actors, through a mechanism that
is not based on the conventional legitimacy provided by elected
governmental bodies, but on the quality of the deliberative
processes amongst the actors. According to Innes and Booher, such
“deliberative” legitimacy will be provided if the interested parties
are able to deliberate together in a “non-coercive environment”
with valid information and with a view to reaching agreement on ac-
tions to undertake (p. 204).
These three core conditions of effective social learning have been
observed in manywell-documented cases of successful collaboration
in natural resource management. In the context of the Common
Agricultural Policy, collaborations amongst multiple stakeholders
in environmental management organisations, such as in the German
Altmühltal mentioned above (OECD, 2013), are good examples
where the interaction amongst a high diversity of interdependent
actors around agri-environmental issues, in a non-coercive environ-
ment, has led to a robust social learning process. In contrast,
governmental advisors employed under the agri-environmental
scheme have a much more ambiguous role, as they can be associated
with the control functions of the government, which might hamper
their role as a facilitator of “non-coercive” and open-ended social
learning processes. This is probably one of the reasons why, in
many countries, the organisation of such advice has been outsourced
to non-proﬁt organisations focused on nature protection or to
universities. In addition, many other non-proﬁt organisations con-
tribute to knowledge co-production amongst the multiple stake-
holders, even though they often lack the resources for doing so. For
instance, in Canada, a highly successful governmental policy for the
implementation of environmental practices in farming practices is
based on support to learning processes in clubs of farmers that ex-
change technical knowledge on a peer to peer basis (Mathe and
Rivaud, 2009). Such clubs exist in many EU countries as well
(cf. the CETA and COMICE, mentioned in Table 3 of the questionnaire
below). However, in many countries these peer to peer farmer orga-
nisations are not focused on environmental issues, and, if they are,
lack political and ﬁnancial support (Mathe and Rivaud, 2009). The
various possible efﬁciency enhancing (technical/administrative)
and social learning roles of collaborative network organisations in
agri-environmental landscapes have been represented schematical-
ly in ﬁg. 2.
4. Materials and Methods
To assess the potential contribution of the network bridging organi-
sations in the effective implementation of the agri-environmental poli-
cy, this paper focuses in particular on one case, which is the agri-
environmental scheme of the Walloon Region (Belgium) in the 5-year
period with the farmers from 2007 to 2013 (Walloon Rural Develop-
ment Programme: GouvernementWallon, 2008). For comparative pur-
poses this study included all the measures of the programme, with the
exception of the AEM11 which applies speciﬁcally to conversion to
and support for organic farming.
In particular, through analysing a series of structured in-depth
ﬁeld interviews with farmers, this paper aims to better understand
the incompleteness of the direct governmental regulation approach
and the possible contribution of the network bridging organisations
to the provision of agri-environmental public goods. For this
purpose, this study uses a model which combines explanatory
variables from both these approaches: variables related to the
governmental compensation payment scheme (the monitoring
scheme, the monetary compensation and the on-farm conditions
that determine if farmers are “eligible” to the scheme) and variables
to identify the role of various network bridging organisations
(Fig. 4). In this model these variables jointly contribute to two out-
come variables:
(a) aﬁrst outcomevariable related to the decision of farmers to enter
into the environmental service provision contract and
(b) a second outcome variable related to the change in the farmers'
practices in direct relation to the implementation of these
contracts.
The environmental service contracts and the change in farmers'
practices in direct relation to these contracts are supposed to contribute
to a set of environmental outcomes. The latter are not directly part
of this study, as the relation between adhesion and production of envi-
ronmental outcomes has been analysed extensively elsewhere
(Berendse et al., 2004) and is the object of regular compulsory evalua-
tions and adjustments of the scheme by the EU member states, includ-
ing for the Walloon agri-environmental scheme. Fig. 3 schematically
represents these variables of the model.
Fig. 2. The role of network bridging organisations in social learning on agri-environmental public goods provision (PG).
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The structured interviews explored farmers' choices for
executing environmental service provision contracts in a situation
where these farmers can adhere to one or several of the 13 agri-
environmental measures deﬁned in Table 1 above. The informa-
tion on the adhesion of each farmer to the measures was
double-checked with information provided by the Walloon Region
and that was available to the authors on a conﬁdential basis.
Structured questionnaires were used in this study to analyse
the farmer decisions on each of these 13 proposed measures. To
understand the impact of the governmental compensation scheme,
variables were included to account for the following factors:
(1) likeliness to be eligible to apply for the measures of the
scheme (deﬁned by the government in function of the ecological
potential for each measure), (2) transaction costs, (3) the level of
the compensation payment and (4) the role of the governmental
advisers (inter alia based on the studies reported in Bonnieux
and Dupraz, 2007). Control variables were included in the study
to check for speciﬁcities related to the type of production system
and for the farmers' motivations (to take into account the results
from the literature on biodiversity contracting reported in
Primmer et al., 2014). Prior to administering the questionnaire, a
set of 13 in depth interviews were conducted with the agri-
environmental advisors of the programme and key selected ex-
perts. The study was organised in a qualitative and a quantitative
part.
The qualitative part consisted of in-depth, “on-the-farm”,
interviews with 34 farmers using a common structured question-
naire, from April to July 2013. The 34 qualitative “on-the-farm” in-
terviews were selected in a way to be representative of the various
types of agricultural production systems in the Walloon Region
(cereal cultivation, dairy and meat) and were organised in two
clusters (a ﬁrst cluster of 11 farmers with a high level of environ-
mental practices and a second cluster of 23 farmers with conven-
tional intensive production systems). This clustering was done so
Fig. 3. Combining direct regulation and network governance in agri-environmental policy.
Fig. 4.Knowledge network around the farmers involved in AEM in theWalloon Survey (data from the ﬁgures calculatedmanually from the data from questions 62 and 65 of the survey, cf.
Annex 2; national/regional state includes the governmental agri-environmental advisors). Legend: Thickness of the arrows represents the frequency of the contacts: thickest arrow N90%
respondents indicated to have a contact at least 1/year; intermediary thickness (between 70 and 90%), thin arrow (between 50 and 70%). Triangle/square: respondents indicated that a
certain percentage of the interaction concerned the follow-up of environmental practices (over 40% of the interactions included an environmental knowledge interaction (triangle), be-
tween 20% and 40% (square), the others less than 20%).
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as to understand the effect of the contact with the network bridg-
ing organisation on the farmers' adhesion to the deep and medium
measures in two different situations of environmental practices.
The quantitative part consisted of a telephone survey carried
out from November 2013 to the beginning of February 2014
with 153 farmers. These farmers were selected to be representative
of the various types of agricultural production systems in the
Walloon Region (cereal cultivation, dairy and meat) and according
to a purposive sampling amongst a list of farmers who have
periodic contact with several of the collaborative network organi-
sations discussed in the theory section above. Amongst the 153
farmers, one farmer was excluded because of bad interview condi-
tions and two were excluded because of incomplete answers. 22
Farmers with a low level of contact and who participated in none
of the 13 AEM's were also included as a control group. However,
these were excluded from the statistical analysis through
likewise deletion (cf. legend to Table 4). The various network
bridging organisations, along with a set of other organisations
that were selected as control variables, are listed in Table 3 for
the speciﬁc case of the Walloon Region. The following four types
of knowledge provision were considered to select the organisations
in this table:
• Knowledge co-production and social learning with a public good
orientation (the various organisations fulﬁlling some of the roles
of network bridging organisations, such asmulti-stakeholder collabo-
rations bynature reserve organisations, Local ActionGroups under the
Leader programme of the EU or research partnerships) (Section 1. in
Table 3)
• Transmission and dissemination of technical administrative knowl-
edge for market cooperation (for example exchange of technical
knowledge in cooperatives) (Section 2. in Table 3)
• Knowledge co-production and social learning with a private or club
good orientation (for example professional federations and unions)
(Section 3. in Table 3)
• Transmission and dissemination of technical administrative knowl-
edgewith a public good orientation (for example knowledge transmis-
sion by the implementation advisors of the government (conseillers
agro-environnementaux)) (variable AE advisors in Table 4 below and
Annex 1).
5. Results and Discussion
The results of the 34 qualitative ﬁeld interviews, based on the
common structured questionnaire, point to a positive role of net-
work bridging organisations in the commitment to environmental
practices. These results are reported in the electronic supplementary
material to this article (cf. results and discussion of the structured
ﬁeld interviews).
To analyse the results of the quantitative survey the two following
sub-models were developed:
• A ﬁrst sub-model: to test for the impact of network bridging organisa-
tions on the adoption of deep and/or medium agri-environmental
measures.
• A second sub-model: to test for the impact of network bridging
organisations on change in practices by the farmer for implementing
the MAE.
Table 4
Results of the biprobit models. Detailed discussion of the correlations and the variables follows in the text below; the technical description of the variables is presented in Annex 1. The
questions of the structured questionnaire are provided in the electronic supplementary material.
Dependent variables of the two sub-models
Adhesion M–D P N |z| Change in practices M–D P N |z|
Adhesion to deep/medium
measures as compared to
adhesion to light measures
only
For at least one medium or deep
measure, the farmer both changed
certain practices on his farm for the
implementation of that measure and
chose an environmentally interesting
land parcel for that measure
Network governance model for compensation payments
Monitoring and technical advice from governt AE advisors (+) 0.389 (+)⁎⁎ 0.020
Network bridging organisations Env Network Org (+)⁎⁎⁎ 0.004 (+)⁎⁎⁎ 0.005
Collab Env Research (+) 0.507 (+)⁎ 0.096
On-farm ecological potential Condpedo (−)⁎⁎⁎ 0.001 (−)⁎⁎⁎ 0.002
Organic (+)⁎ 0.063 (+)⁎⁎ 0.029
Some ﬁelds in Natura 2000 (+) 0.346 (+)⁎ 0.074
Governt scheme of monetary payments Compensation payt (+) 0.665 (+) 0.513
Transaction costs (−)⁎⁎⁎ 0.006 (−)⁎ 0.093
Control variables
Farmers' motivations related to the MAEmeasures Conception agricultural pract (−)⁎⁎ 0.034 (−) 0.320
Env objectives (+) 0.362 (+) 0.862
Env objectives refusal (−)⁎ 0.056 (+) 0.934
General farmers' motivations High biodiv concern (−) 0.647 (+) 0.898
Type of production system Dairy (−) 0.424 (+) 0.434
No contact sales rep. (+)⁎ 0.071 (+)⁎⁎ 0.015
Nb of observations= 128. Two of the 152 interviewees were excluded due to incomplete answers, 22 interviewees who adhered to noMAEwere excluded due to likewise deletion in the
statistical analysis, as themeasurement of the variables Conception agricultural pract, Envt objectives, Env objective refusal and Change in practices M–D require to adhere at least to one
MAE, cf table in Annex 1. Wald chi2(28) = 73.87; Prob N chi2 = 0.0000. Likelihood ratio test of rho21 = 0. Chi2(1) = 13.6573, Prob N chi2 = 0.0002.
Note that the table shows associations, not necessarily causal relationships. A bivariate probit (biprobit) systemwas estimated jointly for the two dependent variables (AdhesionM–D and
Change in practices M–D). The Likelihood ratio test of rho21 conﬁrms the choice of the bivariate probit framework. Conventional collinearity tests amongst the explanatory and control
variables were conducted within Stata and showed no sign of collinearity amongst the variables (mean Variance Inﬂation Factor (VIF) = 1.24; SQRT VIF below 1.5 for all variables).
⁎ Signiﬁcant at 90% level.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 95% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 99% level.
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The results of the quantitative survey (cf. Table 4) are consis-
tent with the ﬁndings of the qualitative survey. In particular,
the statistical survey shows a signiﬁcant correlation between par-
ticipation in two major types of network bridging organisations
(1.1. and 1.3. in Table 3) and both the adhesion to the scheme
and the change in practices by the farmer when implementing
the AEM measure. The collective actors, listed in Table 3, that
had no speciﬁc environmental orientation or were oriented to
advocacy instead of collaborative implementation actions, or to
market cooperation only, did not show any signiﬁcant correlation
with the two outcome variables (i.e.: all the categories in Table 3,
except for 1.1. and 1.3.).
5.1. Adhesion to Deep/Medium Environmental Measures
The results of the ADHESION M–D sub-model (ﬁrst column of
the outcome variables, Table 4) show that amongst the network
organisations that were tested the fact that farmers had regular
contacts with environmental network organisations (var. ENV.
NETWORK ORG.: regional nature parks, river basin associations,
stakeholder commissions of nature restoration projects and other
government/non-proﬁt environmental management networks) is
signiﬁcantly correlated with the uptake of deep and medium environ-
mental measures. In contrast to the ofﬁcial governmental agri-
environmental councillors or general technical advisors (cf. AE Advisors
below), who provide the information needed to get into the schemes
and understand the technical requirements, these organisations accom-
plish social networking and social learning related to environmental is-
sues in general and are not part of the implementation process of the
AEM scheme.
This result is consistent with the stylised facts on the implementa-
tion of the agri-environmental schemes reported in the literature,
which highlight the positive role of landscape-related network
organisations in an efﬁcient participation in the agri-environmental
measures (OECD, 2013; Juntti and Potter, 2002; Morris, 2006; Van
Herzele et al., 2011; Lockie and Rockloff, 2004; Grasby, 2004; Curtis
and De Lacy, 1996; Mues et al., 1998; ABARE, 2003; Curtis, 2003). In
line with the role of non-proﬁt organisations in social
learning discussed above, the high amount of social learning that is
required for these measures is mostly provided by organisations
that have a clear environmental focus and facilitate social learning
with a broad diversity of interdependent actors. Therefore, as expected,
other social learning organisations listed in Table 3 do not show
the same correlations (cf. the CETA/Comices which does not have
this diversity and the GAL which does not have this environmental
focus).
Although this was not the object of this study, some hints on the
reasons – which are independent from the AEM scheme – why the
farmers have searched contacts with these environmental manage-
ment organisations can be gathered from the qualitative information
collected in the interviews on the nature of each of the organisations
with which the farmers have a contact (information provided for 114
out of the 505 organisations listed by the 152 farmers in the
interviews). This information shows that farmers often get into
contact with environmental management organisations in the
context of speciﬁc services or projects unrelated to the speciﬁc
measures of the AEM scheme as such (general information sessions,
implication of farmers in nature reserve management plans, etc.).
The latter is consistent with the literature discussed in the
theory section on the complementarity between the governmental
and non-governmental service providers. As explained above, non-
governmental providers are particularly contacted when the
issues require operating in a more open-ended non-coercive collab-
orative context which is the case for many complex environmental
issues.
Contact with environmental advisors of the government (var. AE
ADVISORS) is also not signiﬁcantly correlated with adhesion.
One reason for this is that under the current scheme, the AE
advisors only had an information communication role, with the
exception of the MAE 8,9 and 10, where a contact with the govern-
mental environmental advisors is compulsory (GIREA, 2011).
Collaboration with environmental research (var. COLLAB ENVT
RESEARCH) is not signiﬁcant; this may be related to the fact that
this ﬁrst sub-model only analyses the correlation with adhesion to
the scheme and not with change in practices, which is more
knowledge-intensive.
Regarding the other core explanatory variables of the model, the
fact of being situated in a region with good soil and climatic condi-
tions (in the study of the Walloon Region, these are the soils that
are mainly situated to the north of the River Meuse, except for the
Condroz regions which also have quite good soil conditions) (the
variable CONDPEDO) is negatively correlated to adhesion to deep/
medium measures. This indicates that farmers in the regions with
less good soil conditions adhere more to the scheme. This is consis-
tent with the fact that the measures explicitly target the mainte-
nance of landscape components with a high environmental value
(hedges, high natural value grasslands etc.), which are scarce in in-
tensive agricultural grasslands (Aviron et al., 2005; Dahms et al.,
2010; Uthes and Matzdorf, 2013). In addition, it has been shown
that due to lower agricultural opportunity costs, peripheral, margin-
al and difﬁcult-to-farm areas are particularly likely to be enrolled in
the scheme (Evans and Morris, 1997). The sub-group of organic
farmers that were part of the survey (18% of the sample, var. ORGAN-
IC) shows a signiﬁcant positive correlation to adhesion to deep/
medium, which is as expected, as they have less effort to make
in changing their practices for implementing one of the 9 deep/
medium measures that were part of this survey. The same trend
was also observed in Bonnieux and Dupraz, 2007, where a highly sig-
niﬁcant positive correlation was reported between the participation
of farmers in a “payment by results” scheme and their experience
with other agri-environmental schemes including organic farming.
Finally, in relation to the basic economic variables of the model,
farmers who experience high transaction costs for taking part
in the scheme (TRANSACTION COSTS) show a negative correlation.
Several studies point in the same direction, reporting that farmers
tend to respond more positively to scheme prescriptions that
are ﬂexible (Gorton et al., 2008; Mazorra, 2001; Hodge, 2001;
Mettepenningen et al., 2013). However, scheme ﬂexibility does not
come without its risks. Farmers could be tempted to choose options
that involve relatively little change and incur limited costs, most
likely bringing about few environmental gains (Hodge and Reader,
2010).
The variable NO CONTACT SALES REP is positive and signiﬁcantly
correlated with adhesion to deep/medium. This is consistent with
the fact that famers who develop intensive farming practices have
regular contacts with sales representatives. As shown elsewhere,
these intensive farmers have higher opportunity costs in moving to
environmentally demanding practices or adopting deep/medium mea-
sures (Crabtree et al., 1998; Wilson and Hart, 2000; Hartmann et al.,
2006).
Regarding the control variables of the model, some of the
variables related to the farmers' motivations to decide to step into
the scheme are signiﬁcant. The alignment with the farmers'
CONCEPTION OF AGRICULTURAL PRACTICES as an important factor
in the decision is negatively correlated with the adhesion to deep/
medium measures. This is consistent with the fact that these mea-
sures by deﬁnition go further beyond his existing practices, as
highlighted above in the description of these measures. The “lack of
appropriate design to realise environmental objectives” as a motiva-
tion for not adhering to some measures (var. ENV OBJECTIVES
REFUSAL) is correlated with a higher adhesion to the deep/medium
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measures. The latter might indicate that an unconvincing design of the
scheme by the government plays a role in the refusal to adopt some of
thesemeasures, especially for the farmerswho have a higher overall in-
volvement with the scheme.
The remaining control variables are not signiﬁcant. One important
variable that is not signiﬁcant is the degree of concern expressed over
biodiversity by the farmer on a Eurobarometer scale (var. HIGH BIODIV
CONCERN: eurobarometer, 2011, question QB3; and the environmental
concern scale (ECS) adapted fromWeigel and Weigel, 1978). In accor-
dance with the results of Howley et al., 2014, there is no signiﬁcant cor-
relation between the expressed concern and adhesion to the scheme.
This result is surprising considering that a high level of environmental
awareness or environmental values amongst farmers is critical for
biodiversity protection (Poláková et al., 2011; Potter et al., 1991;
Macdonald and Johnson, 2000). Even though this variable only partially
represents the framing of biodiversity issues by the farmers, the result
probably suggests that some farmerswho consider that biodiversity de-
crease is not amongst the most important environmental problem are
nevertheless willing to step into service contracts. Moreover, as speci-
ﬁed by Willock et al., 1999, attitudes and behaviour are not always
linked. In particular, adhesion of the farmers is also related to a diversity
of socially shared and publicly debated values and understandings,
whose legitimacymight be increased through the contactwith interme-
diary organisations, and not only to the individual farmer's attitudes
(cf. for similar evidence along these lines, Kenter et al., 2014).
5.2. Change in Practice for Medium/Deep Measures
The second model (CHANGE IN PRACTICES M–D) compares
the change in practices related to the AEM scheme by farmers who
adopted at least one deep or mediummeasure as compared to absence
of change in practice when adopting the deep or medium measures or
the adoption of light measures only. The model considers a change in
practice if the farmer states, for at least one medium or deep measure
to which he adheres, that he changed certain practices on his farm for
the implementation of that measure. If the MAE measures require the
choice of an environmentally interesting land parcel, the model only
considers “a change in practice” if the farmer explicitly conﬁrms that
he implemented the measure on an environmentally interesting land
parcel.
The responses of farmers that have changed their practice when
implementing medium or deep measures are signiﬁcantly correlated
with the variable “contacts with the environmental network organisa-
tions” (ENV. NETWORK ORG). The latter is in line with our hypothesis
on social learning. However, in this second sub-model this group is
also correlated with the variable “contacts in the context of environ-
mental research organised by universities, governmental institutes or
nature park managers” (var. COLLAB ENV. RESEARCH). These contacts
are less frequent overall (16% out of the statistical sample, compared
to 51% for ENV. NETWORK ORG, cf. table in the annex), but this result
is consistent with the fact that for a substantial number of farmers the
change in practices or the choice of the appropriate land parcel is de-
manding in terms of knowledge generation. In contrast to the previous
model, there is also a signiﬁcant correlationwith the environmental ad-
visors (var. AE Advisors) from the government, which seems to indicate
thepositive role of the environmental advisors in knowledge generation
and social learning related to change in practices for the medium/deep
environmental measures.
Most other core explanatory variables of the model show similar
correlations as under the adhesion sub-model, except for one variable.
The variable some ﬁelds in Natura 2000 is also positively correlated
with change in practices. This can be related to the fact that a farmer
who has some ﬁelds in Natura 2000 has fewer knowledge costs for fur-
ther changing his agricultural practices, as he is already involved in
biodiversity-relatedmanagement for some of his parcels (in part related
to the compulsory measures in Natura 2000 areas). This importance of
the prior knowledge-related factor is consistent with other surveys
(showing that previous participation in agri-environmental payments
schemes leads to a higher rate of change of environmental practices
(Dupraz et al., 2002)).
Finally most control variables show similar correlations as under the
adhesion sub-model, except for two attitudinal variables that are now
not signiﬁcant. This is consistent with the literature highlighting the
lack of attitudinal change generated by the “action-oriented” AEM
schemes, as reported in Section 2.
6. Conclusion
A broad literature on natural resources policies has shown the po-
tential of collaborative networks in fostering change in environmental
practices in various areas. However, most of the empirical analysis
pertaining to collaborative governance has focused on forms of formal
co-management regimes between the state and the concerned actors
on the one hand or on situations of co-governance where the stake-
holders had only a consultative or advisory role to the state.
This paper explored the intermediary case of implementation of
environmental policies through a combination of governmentally
managed monetary incentive schemes and social learning processes
organised by a broad set of network bridging organisations that
foster cooperation and social learning amongst state and non-state
collective actors around environmental management initiatives. To
this end, both in-depth ﬁeld research and a purposive sampling
were organised amongst farmers that take part in such schemes
and who are interacting with a broad range of networks of state
and non-state collective actors. Two main lessons may be drawn
from the analysis. First, in a situation where farmers get involved in
social learning processes and knowledge co-production with other
actors, there is a clear improvement both in adhesion to deep/medi-
um measures (which have a higher level of environmental require-
ments) and in change in environmental practices directly related to
the AEM scheme. This effect is observed both for farmers with high
and low concern for biodiversity depletion. Second, these social
learning processes appear to be especially strong when farmers
have periodic contact with environmentally oriented network bridg-
ing organisations, while they are clearly not signiﬁcant in case of pe-
riodic contacts with non-state collective actors that are oriented
towards advocacy or market coordination.
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